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Overriding Tribal Sovereignty by
Applying the National Labor Relations
Act to Indian Tribes in Soaring Eagle
Casino and Resort v. National Labor
Relations Board
Riley Plumer†
Introduction
On July 1, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit decided Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB.1
The three-judge panel unanimously concluded that the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA),2 a generally applicable federal
statute,3 should not apply to Indian tribes.4 However, by a 2-1
vote, the court held that the NLRA would apply to the tribally†. J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School. Special thanks
to the editors and staff of Law & Inequality for their comments and critiques in
writing this Article. I would also like to thank my parents, Joseph and Ramona
Plumer, for their constant encouragement and belief that I can accomplish
anything I put my mind to.
1. 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
3. A generally applicable federal statute refers to a statute that appears to
apply nationwide. Jessica Intermill, Competing Sovereigns: Circuit Courts’ Varied
Approaches to Federal Statutes in Indian Country, 62 FED. LAW. 64, 65 (Sept.
2015),
http://hogenadams.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/FedLawer-Article.pdf;
see also Jeffrey M. Shaman, Rules of General Applicability, 10 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 419 (2012). The NLRA prohibits “employers” from engaging in unfair labor
practices and gives the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) the authority to
prevent such labor practices. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(1)–(2), 158(a), 160(a) (2012).
The NLRA does contain an express exemption for federal, state, or local
governments; employers who employ only agricultural workers; and employers
subject to the Railway Labor Act (interstate railroads and airlines). 29 U.S.C. §
152(2) (2012). The NLRA, however, does not mention Indian tribes in either the
statute’s text or its legislative history. Id. For purposes of Soaring Eagle, the
Saginaw Chippewa Tribe of Michigan and the NLRB agree that the “NLRA is
entirely silent with respect to Indians and Indian tribes.” Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d
at 658. Other courts have assumed or concluded that the NLRA is a statute of
general applicability. See San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d
1306, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2007); NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316
F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 2003). But see NLRB. v. Pueblo of San Juan, 280 F.3d 1278,
1283 (10th Cir. 2000) (concluding that “the NLRA by its terms is not a statute of
general application, it excludes states and territories”).
4. Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 669–70; id. at 675 (White, J. concurring and
dissenting in part).
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owned and operated casino by the Saginaw Chippewa Tribal
Nation on reservation land.5
The Sixth Circuit ultimately
determined that it was bound by its earlier decision in NLRB v.
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Government, which it
decided twenty-two days earlier.6
In Little River, a Sixth Circuit panel concluded by a 2-1 vote
that the tribal sovereignty of the Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians did not preclude applying the NLRA to a tribally-owned
casino located on reservation land.7 The Soaring Eagle court
declared that Little River was wrongly decided, and explained that
“if writing on a clean slate,” it would have instead followed
Supreme Court precedent regarding the applicability of generally
applicable laws to Indian tribes.8 The Soaring Eagle court added
that, if it was not bound by Little River, it would have held that
the NLRA—which does not contain any congressional intent to
apply to Indian tribes—should not apply to tribes.9
Following Little River and Soaring Eagle, the Little River
Band of Ottawa Indians and the Saginaw Chippewa Tribal Nation
petitioned to the Supreme Court of the United States to review the
decisions.10 The tribes asked the Court to overturn the Sixth
Circuit’s rulings and align the decisions with Supreme Court
precedent.11 However, the Supreme Court declined to grant
review of the cases to address the question of whether the NLRB
has authority to assert jurisdiction on reservation land and solicit
tribal casino employees to join labor unions.12
5. Id. at 662 (“[W]e must conclude in this case that the Casino operated by the
Tribe on trust land falls within the scope of the NLRA, and that the NLRB has
jurisdiction over the Casino.”).
6. 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015).
7. Id. at 555 (holding that applying the NLRA to the Little River Band “does
not undermine the Band’s right of self-government in purely intramural matters,
and we find no indication that Congress intended the NLRA not to apply to a tribal
government’s operation of tribal gaming . . . .”).
8. Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 670 (“[I]f writing on a clean slate, we would
conclude that . . . the Tribe has an inherent sovereign right to control the terms of
employment with nonmember employees at the Casino . . . .”).
9. Id.
10. NLRB v. Little River of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir.
2015), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 12, 2016) (No. 15-1024); Soaring Eagle
Casino and Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Feb. 12, 2016) (No. 15-1034).
11. Little River, 788 F.3d 537, petition for cert. filed at 19; Soaring Eagle, 791
F.3d 648, petition for cert. filed at 15.
12. See NLRB v. Little River of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537 (6th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, (U.S. June 27, 2016) (No. 15-1024); Soaring Eagle Casino
and Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied (U.S. June 27, 2016)
(No. 15-1034).
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Under longstanding principles of federal Indian law, the
Supreme Court takes the position that Congress must clearly
express its intent to limit tribal sovereignty or abrogate treaty
rights.13 The Supreme Court has consistently applied the clear
statement rule to determine whether federal statutes apply to
Indian tribes.14 Under the Supreme Court’s analysis, a federal
statute that is silent on its application to Indian tribes cannot
undermine or limit tribal sovereignty or authorize suit against
Indian tribes.15 The clear statement rule presumes that tribal
sovereignty remains intact when a federal statute does not
mention Indian tribes in its text or legislative history.16 In this
context, the Supreme Court interprets congressional silence to
mean that tribal sovereignty is not abrogated.17 Furthermore, the
Court recognizes the unique nature of Indian tribes, and does not
view tribes as private, voluntary organizations.18 In 2014, the
Supreme Court declared the clear statement rule as “an enduring
principle of Indian law: Although Congress has plenary authority

13. See, e.g., Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884) (“General acts of Congress
[do] not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to
include them.”).
14. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739–40 (1986) (stating that there
must be “clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its
intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to
resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty”); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 173–74 (1999) (applying the test to find
that the “Chippewa’s usufructuary rights were not extinguished” because there was
no “clear evidence” that Congress intended to abrogate the treaty rights); South
Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687 (1993) (“Congress has the power to abrogate
Indians’ treaty rights . . . though we usually insist that Congress clearly express
its intent to do so.”) (citations omitted); Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 380–81,
392–93 (1976) (holding that an ambiguous federal statute did not grant the state of
Minnesota the authority to collect tax on reservation land); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553, 556, 566 (1903) (considering the ability of Congress to abrogate
treaties with Indian tribes).
15. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (“Because the
Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by
the Federal Government, the proper inference from silence . . . is that the sovereign
power . . . remains intact.”) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130, 149 n.14 (1982)).
16. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (“[A] proper
respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress
in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of
legislative intent.”).
17. See Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18.
18. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 388; United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557
(1975) (stating that Supreme Court decisions “establish the proposition that Indian
tribes within ‘Indian country’ are a good deal more than ‘private, voluntary
organizations . . . .’”).
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over tribes, courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact
intends to undermine Indian self-government.”19
The Sixth Circuit’s rulings in Little River and Soaring Eagle
further widens a circuit split and conflicts with Supreme Court
precedent on whether generally applicable federal statues, like the
NLRA, apply to Indian tribes.20 In NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the clear statement
rule to find that the NLRA did not prevent the Pueblo Tribe from
applying its own “right-to-work law” on its own Indian
reservation.21 The Tenth Circuit explained that when “tribal
sovereignty is at stake, the Supreme Court has cautioned that ‘we
tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative
intent’” to abrogate tribal sovereignty.22
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Soaring Eagle relies on dictum
to determine its outcome, and applying the NLRA to the Tribe is
inconsistent with fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty.23
The decision in Soaring Eagle complicates existing case law, and
provides the Supreme Court with an opportunity to address the
applicability of generally applicable federal statutes to Indian
tribes.24
In addition, the enactment of the Tribal Labor
Sovereignty Act of 201525 by Congress, which would expressly
19. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031–32 (2014).
20. NLRB v. Little River of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537, 556 (6th
Cir. 2015) (McKeague, J., dissenting); see also Intermill, supra note 3; Steve Biddle
& Danielle Fuschetti, The Sixth Circuit Extends the NLRA’s Reach to Tribal-Owned
Casinos, LITTLER INSIGHT (July 7, 2015), https://www.littler.com/files/2015_7_
insight_6th_circuit_extends_nlra_reach_tribal-owned_casinos.pdf (discussing the
impact of the Little River and Soaring Eagle decisions and the need to clarify
existing law on the issue); Kaighn Smith, Jr., Tribal Self-Determination and
Judicial Restraint: The Problem of Labor and Employment Relations Within the
Reservation, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 533–42 (2008) (discussing the circuit split
in applying generally applicable federal labor and employment statutes to Indian
tribes).
21. 276 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir. 2002).
22. Id. at 1195 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60
(1978)).
23. Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 675 (White, J.,
dissenting).
24. Intermill, supra note 3; see also Bryan H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law,
Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413, 530–31
(2007) (“Only an appeal to the Supreme Court would give th[e] Court the
opportunity to rein in the Board and the lower courts.”); Richard A. Duncan, Toni
M. Everton & Thomas J. Posey, A Look at 6th Circ[uit] Application of NLRA to
Tribal Casino, LAW360 (July 9, 2015, 10:20 AM), http://www.faegrebd.com/
files/111300_A_Look_At_6th_Circ._Application_Of_NLRA_To_Tribal_Casino.pdf
(stating that the circuit split on the issue of whether generally applicable statutes
apply to tribes “appears ripe for Supreme Court review”).
25. On November 17, 2015, the United States House of Representatives passed
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exclude tribes from the NLRA’s definition of employer, would also
resolve the issue presented in Soaring Eagle.
The focus of this Article is on the proper application of the
NLRA and other generally applicable federal statutes to Indian
tribes. The analysis draws on case law discussing the unique
status of Indian tribes within the United States and their
longstanding relationship with the federal government. In this
context, this Article evaluates the application of general federal
statutes to Indian tribes and the issue of tribal sovereignty in
deciding whether the NLRA should encompass tribally-owned and
operated enterprises.
This Article argues that applying the NLRA to Indian tribes
is inconsistent with fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty
and Supreme Court precedent addressing the application of
federal statutes to Indian tribes. This Article further argues that
the decision in Soaring Eagle conflicts with laws promoting the
self-government of Indian tribes. As a result, Soaring Eagle
widens a circuit split on the correct approach to follow when
interpreting the applicability of federal statutes to Indian tribes.
Because of the circuit split and the existence of many other
generally applicable federal statutes, which approach to follow
when determining NLRA applicability to Indian tribes demands
eventual Supreme Court review or Congressional implementation
of an exception that expressly excludes tribes from the Act’s
application.
Part I provides a background on tribal sovereignty and
inherent powers of Indian tribes. Part II proceeds in two parts.
Section A discusses background on the NLRA. Section B discusses
the varying approaches used by federal courts in applying
generally applicable federal statutes to Indian tribes. Section B
includes a discussion on Supreme Court precedent and application
of its clear statement rule. Further, Section B argues that this is
the correct approach courts should follow when applying generally
applicable federal statutes to Indian tribes. In addition, this
section includes a discussion of approaches followed by lower
courts when facing the same issue. Finally, this section argues
that the approaches followed by lower courts are misapplied,
undermine sovereign powers possessed by tribes, and are
H.R. 511, 114th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 2015), referred to as the Tribal Labor
Sovereignty Act of 2015, which would expand the list of entities exempted from the
NLRA’s definition of “employer” by adding “any Indian tribe, or any enterprise or
institution owned and operated by an Indian tribe and located on its Indian lands.”
161 CONG. REC. H8260, H8272 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2015).
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inconsistent with Congress’s plenary power over tribes. Part III
describes the factual and historical background of the Saginaw
Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan. Part IV discusses the Sixth
Circuit’s reasoning and ruling in Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort
v. NLRB.
I.

Tribal Sovereignty and the Unique Status of Tribes
Within the United States
a. The United States Trust-Responsibility to Tribes

The issue of whether generally applicable federal statutes
that do not explicitly mention tribes in their text or legislative
history should apply to tribes is complicated by the historical
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes.26
Before the formation of the United States, “tribes were selfgoverning sovereign political communities.”27 Through treaties,
Indian tribes came under the power of the federal government.28
26. See Vicki J. Limas, Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes
to Native American Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681, 683–84 (1994); Ann Richard, Application of the National Labor
Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act to Indian Tribes: Thwarting the
Economic Self-Determination of Tribes, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 203, 205–07 (2005–
2006) (describing the trust relationship between the United States and Indian
tribes); Intermill, supra note 3, at 65 (arguing that the “trust-responsibility”
doctrine and the plenary power doctrine create foundational inconsistencies for
federal Indian law principles); Brian P. McClatchey, Tribally-Owned Businesses
Are Not “Employers”: Economic Effects, Tribal Sovereignty, and NLRB v. San
Manuel Band of Mission Indians, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 127, 134, 140–41 (2006); San
Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1056 (2004) (acknowledging
that the Board’s decision in ruling on whether the NLRA applies to tribes is
“difficult because Indian tribes occupy a unique position in the Nation’s political
and legal history”).
27. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1978); McLanahan v. Ariz.
State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (“It must always be remembered that
the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that
their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government.”); see also
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978) (“Upon incorporation
into the territory of the United States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the
territorial sovereignty of the United States and their exercise of separate power is
constrained . . . .”); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 8 (Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (stating that
tribes’ “rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, [are] necessarily
diminished”).
28. For a discussion on treaties between the United States and Indian tribes,
see STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 45–54 (4th ed. 2012);
see also FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 5.01–5.04 (2005);
Anna Wermuth, Union’s Gamble Pays Off: In San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino,
The NLRB Breaks the Nation’s Promise and Reserves Decades-Old Precedent to
Assert Jurisdiction Over Tribal Enterprises on Indian Reservations, 21 LAB. LAW.
81, 82–84 (2005) (discussing treaties between the federal government and Indian
tribes during the 1800s).
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In exchange for land, the federal government made promises to
Indian tribes, including agreements to set aside reservation land
for tribes’ exclusive use, protection of tribal sovereignty, and
preservation of the welfare of tribal members.29
These
considerations given by the United States to Indian tribes form
the basis of the trust-responsibility doctrine that has been
characterized as a guardianship over tribes.30 In essence, this
trust relationship imposes on the federal government the
obligation to protect tribal property rights, preserve tribal selfgovernance, and provide services to Indian tribes.31 The special
relationship between Indian tribes and the United States is also
grounded in longstanding Indian law principles.32
The Supreme Court has performed a significant role in
defining the unique relationship between the United States and
Indian tribes.33 Although Indian tribes gave up their rights to the
land they inhabited, the Supreme Court has explained that Indian
tribes continue to exercise “inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty.”34 In a series of cases decided by the Supreme Court
in the 1820s and 1830s,35 Chief Justice Marshall discussed the
legal status of Indian tribes within the United States, which
became a foundational framework for federal Indian law.36 Justice
29. See PEVAR, supra note 28, at 46–47 (discussing exchanges between the
United States and Indian tribes in the context of tribal treaties).
30. Limas, supra note 26, at 683–84 (discussing the “unique relationship
between the federal and tribal governments.”); Richard, supra note 26, at 205–07
(describing the trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes).
31. See MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW HORNBOOK 181–82
(2016).
32. See Julie Thompson, Application of the National Labor Relations Act to
Indian Tribes: Preserving Indian Self-Government and Economic Security, 27 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 189, 195–97 (2001) (discussing tribal sovereignty and the
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes); COHEN, supra
note 28, § 5.04[4][a], at 418 (“One of the basic principles in Indian law is that the
federal government has a trust or special relationship with Indian tribes.”);
WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 35 (5th ed. 2009)
(“Much of American Indian Law revolves around the special relationship between
the federal government and the tribes.”).
33. See CANBY, supra note 32, at 37–39 (discussing the evolution of the trust
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes).
34. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (quoting FELIX COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945)); see also United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886) (stating that although tribes no longer possess “full
attributes of sovereignty,” they remain a “separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations . . .”).
35. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823).
36. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D.
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Marshall characterized Indian tribes as “domestic dependent
nations” that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their
members and territories.37
In Worcester v. Georgia, Justice Marshall discussed Indian
tribes’ inherent right to tribal sovereignty.38 The issue was
whether the State of Georgia could impose its laws within the
boundaries of the Cherokee reservation.39 The Supreme Court
ruled that Georgia could not subject the Cherokee people to its
laws within the reservation lands because the laws were
preempted by the sovereign-to-sovereign relationship that existed
between Indian tribes and the federal government.40 In his
opinion, Justice Marshall stated:
Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original
natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from
time immemorial . . . . The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct
community occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter,
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of [C]ongress.41

The Supreme Court continues to recognize the concept of
inherent tribal sovereignty.42 The inherent powers of tribes are
not powers delegated by Congress, but instead powers possessed
“by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”43

L. REV. 627 (2006) (explaining that the three opinions by Justice Marshall, referred
to as the “Marshall Trilogy” identify the boundaries of Indian law as they remain
today); Phillip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV.
381 (1993).
37. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2. In Cherokee Nation, the Supreme Court held
that the Cherokee Nation could not be regarded as a “foreign state” within the
meaning of the United States Constitution. Id. at 20.
38. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 580.
39. Id. at 516.
40. Justice Marshall concluded that Indian tribes are “nations as distinct
political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority
is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries . . . .” Id. at
557.
41. Id. at 559–61.
42. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 698 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“It is a fundamental principle of federal Indian law that Indian tribes
possess inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished.”) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978)).
43. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“Indian tribes still
possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”).
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As a sovereign government, the primary source of tribal
rights is its right to govern itself.44 The tribal right of selfgovernment encompasses several functions, including: the power
of tribes to determine their own form of tribal government,45 the
power to determine tribal membership,46 the power to enact laws47
and enforce laws within their forum,48 the power to tax,49 the
power to establish a tribal court system,50 and the power to
exclude non-members from tribal lands.51 In addition to these
inherent tribal powers, Indian tribes retain the power of sovereign
immunity from lawsuits, which enables tribes to avoid becoming a
party to litigation without their consent or authorization by
Congress.52 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explained that
although the plenary power doctrine grants Congress the
authority to authorize lawsuits against Indian tribes, a waiver of
sovereign immunity must be clearly and unequivocally
expressed.53
Collectively, these inherent tribal powers enable Indian
tribes to govern their own internal affairs and exercise authority
44. For a general discussion on tribal sovereign rights, see Limas, supra note
26, at 685–90 (1994); see also COHEN, supra note 28, at 211–22 (discussing the
extent of tribal powers over their members and territory); Smith, supra note 20, at
510–13 (explaining attributes of tribal sovereignty and inherent powers of tribes).
45. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978) (explaining
that tribes possess the power to determine their form of self-government, subject to
restrictions placed on tribes by Congress).
46. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (stating that
tribes “retain their inherent power to determine tribal membership . . . ”).
47. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 54 (“[Tribes] have power to make
their own substantive law in internal matters . . . .”) (citations omitted).
48. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012) (providing that tribes have criminal
jurisdiction over tribal members that commit “major crimes” on reservation lands);
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 (1978) (explaining that
tribes have criminal jurisdiction over non-members).
49. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982)
(describing tribes’ power to tax as “an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty
because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial
management. This power enables a tribal government to raise revenue for its
essential services . . . .”).
50. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14–15 (1987)
(recognizing that “[t]ribal courts play a vital role in tribal self-government . . . and
the Federal Government has consistently encouraged this development”) (citations
omitted).
51. See, e.g., Montana, 450 U.S. at 566–67 (holding that tribes may prohibit or
place restrictions on nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land owned by Indian
tribes or held in trust by the federal government).
52. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (“As a
matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has
authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.”).
53. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58–59 (1978).
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over their members and territory.54 Additionally, these attributes
of tribal sovereignty play an important role in promoting efforts to
further tribal economic development and self-determination.55
Through the operation of tribally-owned enterprises located on
reservation lands, Indian tribes work to establish an economic
means of supporting their tribal governmental affairs and
becoming more self-sufficient sovereign nations.56 The Supreme
Court has noted that “Congress has consistently reiterated its
approval of the immunity doctrine” through authorizing limited
classes of lawsuits against tribes, which “reflect[s] Congress’ [sic]
desire to promote the ‘goal of Indian self-government, including its
‘overriding goal’ of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic
development.”57
b. The Plenary Power Doctrine
The plenary power doctrine appears to contradict the United
States’ trust-responsibility to commit its national honor58 in
fulfilling treaty responsibilities with tribes.59 The United States
Constitution grants Congress general powers to legislate in
regards to Indian tribes.60 Under the plenary power doctrine, the
federal government can assert essentially unlimited authority over
Indian tribes subject to the Constitution and its trustresponsibility to the tribes.61 The Supreme Court has consistently
held that although Indian tribes have inherent sovereign powers,

54. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983)
(explaining that the sovereignty retained by tribes encompasses “the power of
regulating their internal and social relations . . .”) (quoting United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886)).
55. Limas, supra note 26, at 690.
56. Id. at 691.
57. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505, 510 (1991) (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480
U.S. 202, 216 (1987)).
58. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2324 (2011)
(quoting Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 437 (1912)).
59. See Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Toward Consent and Cooperation:
Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
507, 551–56 (1987).
60. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
61. The Court in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) stated:
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited
character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to
complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their
existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those
aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.
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Congress has authority to limit, modify, or eliminate the powers of
self-government which the tribes otherwise possess.62
The trust-responsibility doctrine and the plenary power
doctrine create tension for courts to address the question of
whether generally applicable federal statutes apply to Indian
tribes.63 Although tribal treaties are the supreme law of the land64
and the United States is under a trust-responsibility to tribes,
Congress’s power to enact federal laws that preempt tribal law has
the effect of undermining tribal sovereignty.65 For instance,
applying the NLRA to tribally-owned enterprises located on
reservation land abrogates both the tribes’ right to enact rules and
the right to exclude individuals from reservation land.66 The right
of self-government would be abrogated by preventing tribes from
applying their own labor codes or from exercising jurisdiction to
resolve labor dispute in their own tribal court systems.67 The right
to exclude nonmembers would be impaired by denying tribes the
authority to prohibit labor organizers from entering tribal lands.68
II. Application of Federal Laws of General Applicability to
Indian Tribes
a. Background on the National Labor Relations Act
Like most federal labor and employment statutes,69 the
NLRA is silent with respect to its application to Indian tribes.70
62. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896) (describing the power of tribal self-government
limited by the “paramount authority of [C]ongress”).
63. See Intermill, supra note 3, at 65 (describing the tension between the trustresponsibility and plenary power doctrines as “the root of the question” of whether
courts choose to apply generally applicable federal statutes to Indian tribes).
64. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
65. See Intermill, supra note 3, at 65.
66. Id. at 66; see also Brief for Chickasaw Nation as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. NLRB, Docket No.13-01569
(6th Cir. May 3, 2013), (Nos. 13-1569 and 13-1629), 2013 WL 10180847, at *27
(“Applying the NLRA to Tribes . . . would abrogate their Treaty-protected rights of
self-government by subjecting government operations to the continuing consent of
their employees’ bargaining representatives.”).
67. Intermill, supra note 3, at 66.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, De Facto Judicial Preemption of Tribal
Labor and Employment Law, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 435, 440–64 (2008);
Thompson, supra note 32, at 191 (explaining that “several federal statutes that
regulate many aspects of the employment relationship” do not expressly mention
Indian tribes within the language of the statute).
70. See, e.g., NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788
F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The NLRA is a statute of general applicability and is

142

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 35:131

The NLRA ensures employees the right to self-organize, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively, and to
engage in other activities.71 Additionally, the NLRA prohibits an
“employer” from engaging in unfair labor practices.72 Under the
NLRA, the term “employer” is defined as not including the “United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision
thereof . . . .”73 The NLRA grants the NLRB the power to enforce
and carry out its policies.74
The Supreme Court has ruled that the NLRA permits States
to regulate their labor relationships with public employees.75 In
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the NLRA applied to schools
operated by church institutions.76 The Court determined that the
NLRB’s jurisdiction is limited in the absence of a clear expression
of congressional intent.77 The Court refused to construe the NLRA
to apply to church-operated institutions in the absence of an
affirmative intent by Congress.78
b. Conflicting Approaches to Applying Generally Applicable
Federal Statutes to Indian Tribes
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to construe federal
statutes to apply to Indian tribes without Congress’s clear intent
to do so.79 This standard ensures that a law generally will not
interfere with tribes’ inherent right to self-government unless
Congress specifically intended to interfere in tribal affairs.80
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s approach closely adheres to the
plenary power doctrine.81 Some courts facing the same issue have
silent as to Indian tribes.”).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2012).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012).
73. Id.
74. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012) (stating that the NLRA empowers the Board
to “prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting
commerce”).
75. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 181 (2007) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(2)).
76. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
77. Id. at 500.
78. Id. at 506–07.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986) (noting that
Congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights was “strongly suggested” by
the statute at issue).
80. Id.
81. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (explaining that
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applied an approach that begins with the presumption that
generally applicable federal statutes should be applied to Indian
tribes.82 Under this approach, courts are willing to accept the
proposition that the NLRA applies to Indian tribes without
congressional intent.83
Part (i) of this section discusses the Supreme Court’s
approach in applying federal statutes to Indian tribes, and argues
that this precedent properly respects tribes’ sovereign rights. Part
(ii) discusses lower courts reliance on dictum in presuming that
generally applicable federal statutes should apply to Indian tribes.
Part (iii) discusses the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene framework that
has led courts to find that generally applicable federal statutes
apply to Indian tribes.
i.

The Clear Statement Rule

The Supreme Court has consistently applied the clear
statement rule to determine that Congress may abrogate the
inherent sovereign rights of tribes, but its intent to abrogate tribal
rights must “be clear and plain.”84 Under this rule, the Supreme
Court is “extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of
treaty rights”85 and it does not construe statutes to abrogate treaty
rights in a manner inconsistent with the intent of Congress.86 In
various decisions, the Supreme Court has applied the clear
statement rule to determine whether certain federal statutes
abrogated tribal rights.87
Congress has been granted broad general powers by the Constitution to legislate
with respect to Indian tribes, and the Supreme Court has consistently described
those powers as “plenary and exclusive”).
82. E.g. Donovan v. Coeur D’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
83. See, e.g., San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the NLRA applied to a casino owned and operated by
the San Manuel Band of Serrano Mission Indians on its own reservation).
84. See, e.g., Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 99, 100 (1884) (“General acts of
[C]ongress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an
intention to include them.”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,
55 (1978); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221 (1958) (concluding that a clear
statement of congressional intent is necessary to permit state civil or criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indian reservation activity); County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992).
85. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n,
443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) (citing Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391
U.S. 404, 412–13 (1968)).
86. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412–13 (1968)
(explaining that the Supreme Court “decline[s] to construe the Termination Act as
a backhanded way [of] abrogating the hunting and fishing rights of these
Indians.”).
87. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (“The power
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In United States v. Dion, the Supreme Court unanimously
concluded that in order to limit tribal sovereignty there must be
evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its
proposed action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the
other, and then chose to resolve the conflict by abrogating the
treaty.88 In Dion, the Court addressed the question of whether the
Eagle Protection Act89 abrogated tribal members’ implied tribal
treaty rights to hunt eagles on reservation land.90 The case
involved a member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe who was
prosecuted for killing four bald eagles while hunting on the Tribe’s
reservation land in South Dakota.91 The Court noted that it has
long required Congress to abrogate Indian treaty rights in a clear
and plain manner because “treaty rights are too fundamental to be
easily cast aside.”92
The Dion court found compelling evidence to suggest that
Congress intended to abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt
eagles.93 The Court explained that the Act’s legislative history
discussed the significance of eagle feathers for Indian religious
ceremonies.94 The text of the statute also provided an express
provision authorizing “the Secretary of the Interior to permit the
taking, possession, and transportation of eagles ‘for the religious
purposes of Indian tribes . . . .’”95
The Court construed this
provision to mean that only the Secretary of the Interior had the
authority to authorize Indians to hunt eagles, and the statute
otherwise prohibits the hunting of eagles by Indians.96 This
exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such
power will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify
the government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in
the interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so.”);
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687 (1993) (“Congress has the power to
abrogate Indians’ treaty rights . . . though we usually insist that Congress clearly
express its intent to do so.”).
88. 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1972).
90. Dion, 476 U.S. at 738.
91. Id. at 735.
92. Id. at 738.
93. Id. at 739–40 (“[W]here the evidence of congressional intent to abrogate is
sufficiently compelling, ‘the weight of authority indicates that such an intent can
also be found by a reviewing court from clear and reliable evidence in the
legislative history of a statute.’”) (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 223 (1982)).
94. Id. at 744.
95. Id. at 742.
96. Id. at 740 (“The provision allowing taking of eagles under permit for the
religious purposes of Indian tribes is difficult to explain except as a reflection of an
understanding that the statute otherwise bans the taking of eagles by Indians, a
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reliable evidence in the statute’s text and legislative history were
sufficient to support the determination that Congress, through the
Eagle Protection Act, intended to abrogate tribal hunting rights
within.97
In NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan,98 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied the clear statement rule to
resolve the issue of whether the NLRA precluded the Pueblo Tribe
from applying its own government ordinance prohibiting union
agreements.99 The Tenth Circuit determined that the Pueblo’s
right-to-work ordinance was an exercise of its tribal sovereign
authority, and that the NLRA would be construed to apply to the
Tribe only if Congress intended.100 Because neither the language
of the statute nor its legislative history mentions Indian tribes, the
Tenth Circuit determined that congressional silence is not
sufficient to undermine Indian tribes’ inherent authority to govern
their own territory.101 The court further stated that the proper
approach to follow is that congressional silence cannot serve to
divest tribal power to govern their territory.102
Similarly, in 2014, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the clear
statement rule in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community to find
that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) did not abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity.103 The IGRA expressly abrogates tribal
sovereign immunity under certain circumstances: suits by states
“to enjoin a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and
conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact . . . .”104 The
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the State of
Michigan had the authority to bring suit against the Tribe’s
gaming activities in violation of the Tribal-State compact taking

recognition that such a prohibition would cause hardship for the Indians, and a
decision that that problem should be solved not by exempting Indians from the
coverage of the statute, but by authorizing the Secretary to issue permits to
Indians where appropriate.”).
97. Id. at 739.
98. 276 F.3d 1186, 1200 (10th Cir. 2002).
99. Id. at 1192 (“In order to find preemption of tribal laws . . . it is necessary to
determine whether Congress intended to divest the San Juan Pueblo of its power
as a sovereign to pass right-to-work laws.”).
100. Id. at 1195 (holding that the court does not “lightly construe federal laws as
working a divestment of tribal sovereignty and will do so only where Congress has
made its intent clear that we do so”).
101. Id. at 1196.
102. Id.
103. 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2033 (2014).
104. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2012).
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place off-reservation.105
The Bay Mills Indian Community
purchased off-reservation land, and constructed and operated a
casino on this land.106 The Supreme Court held Congress did not
authorize the State of Michigan to bring this specific class of suits
against the Tribe because the Tribe’s gaming operations were not
on Indian lands.107
The Supreme Court explained that “a
fundamental commitment of Indian law is judicial respect for
Congress’s primary role in defining the contours of tribal
sovereignty.”108 In conclusion, the Supreme Court refused to
abrogate tribal sovereignty even though construing the statute as
written resulted in an apparent anomaly that permits “a State to
sue a tribe for illegal gaming inside, but not outside, Indian
country.”109
Dion and Bay Mills properly recognize and respect
fundamental federal Indian law principles.110
The decisions
illustrate the Supreme Court’s “deference to Congress’s plenary
and exclusive role in imposing limits on tribal sovereignty.”111 The
Supreme Court’s clear statement rule, used to test whether
Congress abrogates tribal sovereignty reflects tribes’ unique legal
status within the United States, and respects their inherent right
to self-government.112 Furthermore, these decisions show the
extent of evidence necessary to persuade the Supreme Court that
Congress intended to impose limits on tribal sovereignty.113 The
rule ensures that without reliable evidence of Congressional intent
to justify abrogating tribes’ sovereign rights, the court must
presume that Indian tribes continue to retain authority over their
reservations.114

105. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2029.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2032.
108. Id. at 2039.
109. Id. at 2033.
110. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 69, at 436–38 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s approach in determining when Congress intended to abrogate tribal rights).
111. NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indian Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537, 563
(6th Cir. 2015) (McKeague, J., dissenting).
112. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 546 (1974) (acknowledging the
“unique legal status of tribal and reservation-based activities”).
113. See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) (“Absent explicit statutory language, we have been
extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights . . . .”).
114. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959).
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Tuscarora Dictum

Some lower courts have relied on a single statement made by
the Supreme Court in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora
Indian Nations115 to presume that generally applicable federal
statutes should apply to Indian tribes.116 In Tuscarora, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Federal Power
Act (FPA) authorized the taking of off-reservation land owned by
the Tuscarora Tribe in fee simple.117 To resolve the issue, the
Court had to determine whether the FPA covered Indian tribes.118
The Court applied the clear statement rule to find that Congress
intended the FPA to cover lands owned by Indian tribes because it
“defines and treats with lands occupied by Indians.”119 Ultimately,
the Supreme Court determined that because the Tuscarora Tribe
owned the fee land, the lands did not satisfy the statutory
definition of “reservation,” and thus the federal government’s
taking of the land was permitted.120
In a statement not necessary to its holding and widely
considered dictum,121 the Court declared that “it is now wellsettled by many decisions of this Court that a general statute in
terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property
interests.”122 The cases the Court cited to support this statement
115. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
116. For a discussion on the Supreme Court’s reasoning and outcome in
Tuscarora, see Wildenthal, supra note 24; Wermuth, supra note 28, at 88–107;
Intermill, supra note 3, at 66–67; William Buffalo & Kevin J. Wadzinski,
Application of Federal and State Labor and Employment Laws to Indian Tribal
Employers, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1365, 1379 (1995).
117. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 110 (describing the issue in the case as involving
“whether the Tuscarora lands covered by the Commission’s license are a part of a
‘reservation’ as defined and used in the Federal Power Act . . .”).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 118.
120. Id. (“[The FPA] does not exclude lands or property owned by Indians, and,
upon the authority of the cases cited, we must hold that it applies to these lands
owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation.”).
121. See NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d
537, 557 (6th Cir. 2015) (McKeague, J., dissenting) (stating that the Tuscarora
statement “was not essential” to the Court’s holding and “is in the nature of dictum
and entitled to little precedential weight”); Mitchell Peterson, The Applicability of
Federal Employment Law to Indian Tribes, 47 S.D. L. REV. 631, 642–44 (2002); San
Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1071 n.61 (2004) (stating that
the “language from Tuscarora is mere dictum premised on inapposite authority.”);
Maureen M. Crough, A Proposal For Extension of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act to Indian-Owned Businesses on Reservations, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 473,
486 (1985); COHEN, supra note 28, at 412 (“[The] statement was not part of the
Court’s holding or necessary to it, because ample evidence supported the shaky
foundation.”).
122. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 116.
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involved income tax statutes that subjected “every individual” to
income tax and did not exempt “either Indians or any other
persons from their scope.”123 Because the Tuscarora Indian Nation
owned the land at issue in fee simple and it was not within the
meaning of a “reservation,” it was not necessary for the Supreme
Court to analyze whether Congress intended the FPA to
encompass Indian tribes.124 Despite making this statement, the
Supreme Court did not overrule its longstanding rule that general
acts of Congress should not be applied to Indian tribes unless
there is a clear expression to the contrary.125 Lower courts have
relied on the Court’s statement, however, made in the context of
tax exemptions to create a presumption in favor of applying
generally applicable federal laws to Indian tribes.126
iii.

The Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene Rule

In 1985, twenty-five years following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Tuscarora, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decided Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm.127
The Ninth Circuit adopted a new approach in applying generally
applicable federal statutes to Indian tribes.128 The court began its
analysis by adopting the Tuscarora presumption that the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) applied to a triballyowned and operated enterprise.129 The Ninth Circuit also agreed
with the Tribe that the “language from Tuscarora is dictum,” but
the court stated that “it is dictum that has guided many of our
decisions.”130 To support this statement, the court cited to cases
involving individual Indians, not Indian tribes.131 The Ninth
Circuit further stated that it had not adopted the clear statement
123. See id. at 116–17.
124. See NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d
537, 558 (6th Cir. 2015) (McKeague, J., dissenting) (“The Tuscarora Court did not
have to define the scope of the Federal Power Commission jurisdiction in the face of
congressional silence . . . .”).
125. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024. 2033 (2014).
126. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 28, at 128–29; D. Michael McBride, III & H.
Leonard Court, Labor Regulation, Union Avoidance and Organized Strategies on
Tribal Lands: New Indian Gaming Strategies in the Wake of San Manuel Band of
Indians v. National Labor Relations Board, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1259, 1287
(2007) (describing courts’ willingness to apply federal labor and employment laws
to tribes in the absence congressional intent).
127. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
128. See Intermill, supra note 3, at 67 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of
the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene framework and its influence on other courts).
129. Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1115–16.
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rule.132 Instead, under the Ninth Circuit’s framework, a federal
law, if silent on the issue of applicability to Indian tribes, will not
apply to them,” unless one of three exceptions is met:
(1) the law touches “exclusive rights of self-governance in
purely intramural matters”; (2) the application of the law to
the tribe would “abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian
treaties”; or (3) there is proof by legislative history or some
other means that Congress intended [the law] not to apply to
Indians on their reservations . . . .” In any of these situations,
Congress must expressly apply a statute to Indians before we
will hold that it reaches them.133

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Coeur d’Alene has established
a strong presumption that generally applicable federal statutes
should be applied to Indian tribes.134 The Second, Seventh, Ninth,
and Eleventh circuits have applied the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene
framework to determine whether generally applicable federal
statutes apply to Indian tribes.135 Accordingly, courts have found
that some federal labor and employment statutes should be
applied to Indian tribes.136 This analytical framework has also led
the NLRB to alter its stance on the applicability of the NLRA to
Indian tribes.137
In 2004, in San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB,
the San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino brought suit after the
Board overturned its own precedent by ruling that the Casino, a
tribally-owned casino on reservation land, was subject to the
NLRB’s jurisdiction under the NLRA.138 Originally in 1976, the
132. Id. at 1116 (stating that it had not “adopted the proposition that Indian
tribes are subject only to those laws of the United States expressly made applicable
to them”).
133. Id. (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893–94 (9th Cir. 1985)).
134. See Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D.
L. REV. 691, 706 (2005) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Donovan v.
Coeur d’Alene “establishes a rebuttable presumption stacked against tribal
interests”).
135. See Intermill, supra note 3; Duncan, supra note 24.
136. See Wildenthal, supra note 24, at 455; Singel, supra note 134, at 691
(stating that the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene framework has been applied by six
courts of appeals without review by the Supreme Court).
137. See San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1055 (2004).
138. The Board stated:
For almost 30 years, the Board has wrestled with the question of whether
the Act applies to the employment practices of this Nation’s Indian tribes.
During that time, the Indian tribes and their commercial enterprises have
played an increasingly important role in the Nation’s economy. As tribal
businesses have grown and prospered, they have become significant
employers of non-Indians and serious competitors with non-Indian owned
businesses. This case requires the Board to accommodate Federal labor
policy and Federal Indian policy in deciding whether to assert jurisdiction,
under the Act, over tribal enterprises.
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Board in Fort Apache Timber Co. v. NLRB first ruled that the
tribally-owned enterprises located on Indian reservations were
implicitly exempt as “employers” under the NLRA’s coverage.139
Relying on established Indian law principles, the Board held that
a timber company owned by the White Mountain Apache Tribe on
reservation land was immune from “federal intervention, unless
Congress has specifically provided to the contrary.”140 In reaching
its decision, the Board noted that a tribal council on a reservation
should be treated as a government by Congress and courts.141 In
other decisions, the Board ruled that tribally-owned enterprises
operated on reservation lands were “governmental entities” that
were “political subdivisions,” exempt from the NLRA’s definition of
“employer.”142
The Board in San Manuel reversed its prior decisions in
finding for the first time that, as a statute of “general application,”
the NLRA should be applied to Indian tribes.143 The Board
adopted the proclaimed “well established” Tuscarora presumption
to determine that Congress intended the NLRA to have the
“broadest possible breadth permitted under the Constitution.”144
The Board reasoned that because the NLRA did not expressly
exclude tribes from its coverage, Congress decided to encompass
Indian tribes within the meaning of the Act.145 The Board applied
the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene framework to determine whether
tribal sovereignty precluded the application of the NLRA to
tribes.146
The Board considered whether the assertion of
jurisdiction over the Tribe would “touch exclusive rights of selfgovernance in purely intramural matters” similar to “tribal
membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations.”147 The
Board found that because the casino substantially affected
interstate commerce and many of the casino’s employees were not
Id. at 1056. See also McBride & Court, supra note 126 (discussing the San
Manuel decision); Singel, supra note 134; Wildenthal, supra note 24.
139. Fort Apache Timber Co. v. NLRB, 226 N.L.R.B. 503, 506 (1976) (concluding
that the “Tribal Council, and its self-directed enterprise on the reservation that is
here asserted to be an employer, are implicitly exempt as employers within the
meaning of the Act”).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Singel, supra note 134, at 694 (discussing the Board’s reluctance to
apply the NLRA to Indian tribes in several cases).
143. See San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1063 (2004).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1063.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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tribal members, the operation of a casino was not an exercise of
self-governance.148 Ultimately, the Board determined that it could
properly assert jurisdiction over the Tribe’s casino on reservation
land.149
In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision in San Manuel by finding
that applying the NLRA to the Tribe was justified.150 The D.C.
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court’s statement in Tuscarora is
“possibly dictum.”151 Furthermore, the court stated that the
Board’s decision in San Manuel failed to consider the Tribe’s
interests in exercising its essential self-government functions,
including its power to regulate labor relations and power to
exclude non-members from its lands.152 Following this decision,
the NLRB continued to assert jurisdiction over Indian tribes,
including the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan.153
III. Background on the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of
Michigan
The Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan is a
federally recognized Indian tribe that resides on the Isabella
Indian Reservation in Mount Pleasant, Michigan.154 Through
treaties with the federal government, the Tribe ceded land to the
United States.155 In an 1855 treaty, the bands of the Saginaw,
Swan Creek, and Black River ceded lands to the United States.156
Under another treaty in 1864, additional lands reserved to the
bands under the 1855 treaty were relinquished.157 Under the 1864
treaty, the Isabella Reservation was designated “for the exclusive
use, ownership, and occupancy” of the Saginaw Chippewa
Indians.158 These treaties grant the Tribe the authority to govern
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
151. Id. at 1311.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., McBride & Court, supra note 126, at 1264 (“Under the authority of
the San Manuel decision, the Board has asserted jurisdiction and summarily
denied challenges of two tribal governments to the application of the Act on Indian
lands.”).
154. Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 651 (6th Cir.
2015).
155. Id.
156. Treaty with the Chippewa of Saginaw art. 3, Aug. 2, 1855, 11 Stat. 633.
157. Treaty with the Chippewa of Saginaw art. 2, Oct. 18, 1864, 14 Stat. 657.
158. Id.
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itself and exclude individuals from the lands located within the
reservation.159 The Tribe currently has over 3,000 members.160
The Tribe makes decisions through a twelve-member tribal
council, which is elected by the tribal members.161 The tribal
council governs and manages economic development for the
Saginaw Tribe, and enacts laws applicable to tribal members.162
In 1993, the Saginaw Tribe entered into a gaming compact
with the state of Michigan to conduct gaming operations on the
Isabella Reservation in accordance with the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA).163 As required by IGRA, the Saginaw
Tribe uses its gaming revenue for self-governance, to discharge
essential government functions, and to provide economic
opportunities for tribal members and others.164 Similar to many
Indian tribes across the country, gaming continues to function as
an important economic development tool for the Saginaw Tribe.165
The casino generates approximately $250 million in gross annual
revenues by drawing in roughly 20,000 customers each year.166
The Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort produces the Tribe’s primary
income source, with its gaming operations generating
approximately ninety percent of its overall income.167 The Tribe’s
gaming revenue is used primarily to fund its 37 governmental
departments and 159 tribal programs.168 Some of the Tribe’s
departments include health administration, social services, tribal
police and fire departments, utilities, a tribal court system, and
education for tribal members.169
Soaring Eagle Casino employs approximately 3,000
employees, seven percent of whom are tribal members.170 The
Saginaw Tribe adopted and implemented an employee handbook,
which includes a no-solicitation policy that prohibits casino
employees from engaging in solicitation related to union

159. See Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 651 (“It is undisputed that the Treaties
preserved the Tribe’s right to exclude non-Indians from living in the territory.”).
160. Id. at 652.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
164. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012).
165. COHEN, supra note 28, at § 12.02(1).
166. Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 652.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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activities.171 The dispute in Soaring Eagle arose when the
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (Union) filed a
complaint against the Tribe with the NLRB.172 The complaint was
filed on behalf of a non-tribal member employee of the Soaring
Eagle Resort and Casino.173 The complaint alleged that the Tribe
violated § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA because of its a no-solicitation policy
and banning of employee discussion of union activities at the
casino.174 The Tribe moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction contending that the NLRA did not apply to the Tribe’s
activities as a sovereign.175 Additionally, the Tribe argued that
the Board could not assert jurisdiction over the Soaring Eagle
Casino located on the Isabella Reservation.176
On March 26, 2012, in an administrative adjudication, the
NLRB held that the NLRA applied to the Tribe’s gaming
operations and, as a result, it concluded that it had jurisdiction to
review the merits of the complaint.177
IV. Analysis of Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. National
Labor Relations Board
a.

The Sixth Circuit’s Reliance on Little River to Find that
the NLRB Has Jurisdiction on Indian Reservation Land

In Soaring Eagle, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the NLRB’s
order prohibiting the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe from
applying its own tribally-enacted no-solicitation policy against
employees at the Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort.178 The Sixth
Circuit indicated that it was bound by its earlier decision in Little
River even though it did not agree with the majority’s adoption of
the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene framework or its analysis of tribal
sovereignty.179
In Little River, the majority affirmed the NLRB’s decision
that the NLRA could apply to the casino resort operated by the

171. Id.
172. Id. at 653.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 654.
178. Id. at 675 (“We enter judgment enforcing the Board’s order and deny the
Tribe’s petition for review.”).
179. Id.
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Little River Band of Ottawa Indians within its reservation on
trust land.180 The majority opinion adopted the Tuscarora-Coeur
d’Alene framework applied by the Ninth Circuit for interpreting
generally applicable federal statutes to Indian tribes because it
“accommodates principles of federal and tribal sovereignty.”181
The Sixth Circuit rejected the Tribe’s argument that the NLRA
could not be applied to Indian tribes “without a clear expression
from Congress.”182 The court reasoned that, because many of the
casino employees are not tribal members,183 a clear statement of
congressional intent to apply the NLRA to Indian tribes is not
required in all circumstances.184 Instead, the Sixth Circuit applied
the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene framework to presume the NLRA
applies to Indian tribes and analyze whether any of the three
exceptions in the test were implicated.185
The Little River court found that applying the NLRA to the
Tribe did not implicate its inherent right of self-governance.186
First, the Sixth Circuit determined that the application of the
NLRA to the Tribe did not undermine its ability to generate
revenue through the casino’s operation and fund its
government.187 The court reasoned that the Tribe’s right to
operate commercial enterprises without restrictions imposed by
the federal government is not a feature of self-government, and
the Tribe is not protected from statutes that “may incidentally
affect the revenue streams of tribal commercial operations that
fund tribal government.”188 Second, the Sixth Circuit found that
applying the NLRA to the Tribe did not undermine the Tribe’s
right to enact its own regulations because the Tribe’s regulation
encompasses the activities of both members and nonmember
employees of the casino.189 Accordingly, the court determined that
the NLRA applies to the Little River Tribe because Indian tribes
fit within the NLRA’s definition of “employer.”190
180. NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537,
539–40 (6th Cir. 2015).
181. Id. at 551.
182. Id. at 548.
183. It was estimated that out of the casino’s 905 employees, 107 were enrolled
members of the Little River Band, 27 were members of other Indian tribes, and 771
did not have membership with any tribe. Id. at 540.
184. Id. at 550.
185. Id. at 551.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 553.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 555 (“[I]f Congress intended to include Indian tribes within its
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In his Little River dissent, Judge McKeague criticized the
majority’s reasoning:
The sheer length of the majority’s opinion, to resolve the single
jurisdictional issue before us, betrays its error.
Under
governing law, the question presented is really quite simple.
Not content with the simple answer, the majority strives
mightily to justify a different approach. In the process, we
contribute to a judicial remaking of the law that is authorized
neither by Congress nor the Supreme Court. Because the
majority’s decision impinges on tribal sovereignty, encroaches
on Congress’s plenary and exclusive authority over Indian
affairs, conflicts with Supreme Court precedent, and unwisely
creates a circuit split, I respectfully dissent.191

Echoing the dissent in Little River, the Soaring Eagle court
determined that the legal framework applied by the Little River
panel wrongfully shifts the analysis away from a broad respect for
tribal sovereignty and the application of the clear statement rule
as a requirement to abrogate that sovereignty.192 Despite the
disagreement, the Soaring Eagle panel was bound by its holding
in Little River and reached the same conclusion in the matter
involving the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe.193 The court
rejected the Little River panel’s reasoning in adopting the Coeurd’Alene framework, proposing that it would have mandated the
opposite outcome.194
The Soaring Eagle court then adopted its own approach in
determining whether the NLRA applies by considering whether
applying the Act “impinges on the Tribe’s control over its own
members and its own activities.”195 The court determined that an
employee working for a tribally-owned and operated casino
presents a consensual commercial relationship.196 Therefore, the
court concluded that nonmember casino employees should be
subject to the Saginaw Tribe’s no-solicitation policy.197
In
conclusion, the majority reasoned that, if not for its ruling in Little
River, “we would conclude that, keeping in mind ‘a proper respect
both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of

explicit list of exceptions to ‘employer,’ it would have done so.”).
191. Id. at 556.
192. Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 674 (6th Cir.
2015).
193. Id. at 675.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 667.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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Congress in this area,’ . . . . [the NLRA] should not apply to the
Casino and should not render its no-solicitation policy void.”198
b. The NLRB’s Arguments to Support Jurisdiction Over
Indian Tribes Are Unfounded
In opposing Supreme Court review of Soaring Eagle, the
NLRB argued that there is no clear circuit split on the issue of
applying generally applicable federal statutes to Indian tribes.199
The NLRB itself recognizes that the Sixth and Tenth Circuit
Courts take different analytical approaches to reach contrary
conclusions regarding the applicability of the NLRA to Indian
tribes.200 The NLRB, however, attempts to distinguish the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Pueblo of San Juan on the grounds that, in its
opinion, the court addressed the Tribe’s authority when acting in
its “sovereign” capacity, as opposed to its “proprietary” capacity.201
In Soaring Eagle, all three judges on the panel emphasized that
the Tenth Circuit rejected the analytical approach applied by the
Sixth Circuit.202 In addition, Judge McKeague stated in his Little
River dissent that the Tenth Circuit had “considered . . . and
definitively rejected” the same arguments accepted by the Little
River majority.203
The NLRB’s justification for asserting jurisdiction on casinos
located on reservation land is inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent.204 The NLRB argues that the NLRA applies to Indian
tribes because tribes are not expressly exempt from the definition
of “employer.”205 However, this argument directly conflicts with
the clear statement rule, which mandates that Congress
“unequivocally express” its intent to abrogate tribal sovereignty.206

198. Id. at 670 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)).
199. Brief of Respondent at 13, Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB, 791
F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-1034) (U.S. May 24, 2016).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 14.
202. Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 672.
203. NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 536,
561 (6th Cir. 2015).
204. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 4–9, Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v.
NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-1034) (U.S. June 6, 2016) (discussing
the Supreme Court’s application of the clear statement rule in determining when
federal statutes apply to Indian tribes).
205. See Brief of Respondent at 19, Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB,
791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-1034) (U.S. May 24, 2016) (stating that the
NLRB’s determination that tribes are not “exempted from the definition of
‘employer’ is correct and, at a minimum, entitled to deference”).
206. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031–32 (2014).
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Applying the NLRA to Indian tribes in this manner has the effect
of singling out tribes as the only domestic sovereign subject to the
provisions of the NLRA.207
The correct inference from
congressional silence in the text and legislative history of the
NLRA in regards to Indian tribes is the presumption that
Congress never intended to abrogate tribal sovereignty.208
The NLRB also argued that the question of whether the
NLRA applies to Indian tribes should be left to Congress to
resolve. On November 17, 2015, the United States House of
Representatives passed the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2015,
which would expand the list of entities exempt from the NLRA’s
definition of “employer” to include Indian tribes.209 A legislative
fix by Congress to resolve the issues regarding the applicability of
the NLRB outlined in the Little River and Soaring Eagle decisions
now represents a favorable option for Indian tribes to pursue.210
Conclusion
The Soaring Eagle decision approves of applying the NLRA
to Indian tribes in a way that has not been accepted by the
Supreme Court or justified by Congress’s plenary power of Indian
tribes.211 The Soaring Eagle court acknowledged the current
circuit split on the issue of whether generally applicable statutes
should apply to Indian tribes.212 Following the Supreme Court’s
decision to decline review of Little River and Soaring Eagle, the
question of whether the NLRA permits the NLRB to assert its
jurisdiction on casinos owned and operated by Indian tribes
located on reservation land remains unresolved.
The approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in Soaring Eagle
ignores the importance of tribal sovereignty and tribes’ unique
207. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 5, Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v.
NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-1034) (U.S. June 6, 2016).
208. Id.
209. 161 CONG. REC. H8245, H8272 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2015).
210. See McClatchey, supra note 26, at 183.
211. See Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 675 (6th Cir.
2015) (stating that the court’s decision does not “properly address[] inherent tribal
sovereignty under governing Supreme Court precedent . . .”).
212. The court stated:
In sum, the Second, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and now the Sixth,
Circuits, apply the Coeur d’Alene framework to determine whether
statutes of general applicability apply to Indian tribes, the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits reject it, and the D.C. Circuit applies a fact-intensive
analysis of the tribal activity at issue and a policy inquiry comparing the
federal interest in the regulatory scheme at issue with the federal interest
in protecting tribal sovereignty.
Id. at 673.
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historical status within the United States.
The decision
undermines tribes’ retained rights to regulate matters involving
self-government.213 It intrudes on tribal rights “to undertake and
regulate economic activity within the reservation”214 and on the
longstanding right of tribes to make and enforce their own laws
within their own reservation.215 By permitting the NLRB to assert
jurisdiction on reservation land, the rights of Indian tribes to
regulate their own labor affairs cannot be accomplished.216
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling also infringes on tribes’
rights to place restrictions on nonmembers from entering
reservation land.217
In addition, the Soaring Eagle decision encroaches on
Congress’s exclusive and plenary power over Indian affairs.218 The
longstanding rule is that tribes retain their inherent sovereign
powers until Congress expresses a clear and unequivocal intent to
relinquish tribal rights.219 The Supreme Court has consistently
refrained from finding that tribal rights have been abrogated
without a clear finding of congressional intent. The Supreme
Court’s clear statement rule operates to avoid permitting courts to
make interpretative questions that would be more appropriately
addressed through the legislative process.220 Construing generally
applicable federal statutes to apply to Indian tribes in the absence
of congressional intent, has the effect of “strip[ping] Indian tribes
of their retained inherent authority to govern their own
territory.”221
Eventually, the Supreme Court may take the opportunity to
address the issue presented to the Sixth Circuit in Soaring Eagle.
For now, the enactment of the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of
2015, which would exclude Indian tribes from the NLRA’s
definition of “employer” would be a resolution to the issue
presented to the Sixth Circuit in Soaring Eagle. The unique and
historical nature of Indian tribes demands that tribal sovereignty
be preserved in the context of applying federal statutes to tribes.
213. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (quoting Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)).
214. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 335 (1983).
215. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
216. See Intermill, supra note 3, at 67.
217. See Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 677 (6th Cir.
2015) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
218. See Smith, supra note 20, at 506.
219. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).
220. Limas, supra note 26, at 706–07.
221. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 2002).
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Ultimately, Indian tribes across the nation have a strong interest
in retaining their independence and the right to self-government
over their territory and members to the greatest extent possible.

